Tuesday, April 28, 2020

National coronavirus response: A road map to reopening By Scott Gottlieb, MD

Source: https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/national-coronavirus-response-a-road-map-to-reopening/

March 29, 2020

Key Points

  • This report provides a road map for navigating through the current COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. It outlines specific directions for adapting our public-health approach away from sweeping mitigation strategies as we limit the epidemic spread of COVID-19, such that we can transition to new tools and approaches to prevent further spread of the disease.
  • The authors outline the steps that can be taken as epidemic transmission is brought under control in different regions. They also suggest measurable milestones for identifying when we can make these transitions and start reopening America for businesses and families.
  • In each phase, the authors outline the steps that the federal government, working with the states and public-health and health care partners, should take to inform the response. This will take time, but planning for each phase should begin now so the infrastructure is in place when it is time to transition.
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Executive Summary

This report provides a road map for navigating through the current COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. It outlines specific directions for adapting our public-health strategy as we limit the epidemic spread of COVID-19 and are able to transition to new tools and approaches to prevent further spread of the disease. We outline the steps that can be taken as epidemic transmission is brought under control in different regions. These steps can transition to tools and approaches that target those with infection rather than mitigation tactics that target entire populations in regions where transmission is widespread and not controlled. We suggest measurable milestones for identifying when we can make these transitions and start reopening America for businesses and families.

In each phase, we outline the steps that the federal government, working with the states and public-health and health care partners, should take to inform the response. This will take time, but planning for each phase should begin now so the infrastructure is in place when it is time to transition.

The specific milestones and markers included in the report for transitioning our responses are judgments based on our current understanding, with the goal of facilitating an effective path forward. The epidemic is evolving rapidly, and our understanding of best responses will evolve as well. The broad set of tasks described here requires and will receive high-level, ongoing attention, and it should be updated and refined as additional evidence, context, and insights about the epidemic become available.

To gradually move away from a reliance on physical distancing as our primary tool for controlling future spread, we need:

  1. Better data to identify areas of spread and the rate of exposure and immunity in the population;
  2. Improvements in state and local health care system capabilities, public-health infrastructure for early outbreak identification, case containment, and adequate medical supplies; and
  3. Therapeutic, prophylactic, and preventive treatments and better-informed medical interventions that give us the tools to protect the most vulnerable people and help rescue those who may become very sick.

Our stepwise approach depends on our ability to aggregate and analyze data in real time. To strengthen our public-health surveillance system to account for the unprecedented spread of COVID-19, we need to harness the power of technology and drive additional resources to our state and local public-health departments, which are on the front lines of case identification and contact tracing. Finally, we must expand our investments in pharmaceutical research and development into COVID-19 and promote the rapid deployment of effective diagnostics, therapies, and eventually a vaccine.

Slow the Spread in Phase I. This is the current phase of response. The COVID-19 epidemic in the United States is growing, with community transmission occurring in every state. To slow the spread in this period,1 schools are closed across the country, workers are being asked to do their jobs from home when possible, community gathering spaces such as malls and gyms are closed, and restaurants are being asked to limit their services. These measures will need to be in place in each state until transmission has measurably slowed down and health infrastructure can be scaled up to safely manage the outbreak and care for the sick.

State-by-State Reopening in Phase II. Individual states can move to Phase II when they are able to safely diagnose, treat, and isolate COVID-19 cases and their contacts. During this phase, schools and businesses can reopen, and much of normal life can begin to resume in a phased approach. However, some physical distancing measures and limitations on gatherings will still need to be in place to prevent transmission from accelerating again. For older adults (those over age 60), those with underlying health conditions, and other populations at heightened risk from COVID-19, continuing to limit time in the community will be important.

Public hygiene will be sharply improved, and deep cleanings on shared spaces should become more routine. Shared surfaces will be more frequently sanitized, among other measures. In addition to case-based interventions that more actively identify and isolate people with the disease and their contacts, the public will initially be asked to limit gatherings, and people will initially be asked to wear fabric nonmedical face masks while in the community to reduce their risk of asymptomatic spread. Those who are sick will be asked to stay home and seek testing for COVID-19. Testing should become more widespread and routine as point-of-care diagnostics are fully deployed in doctors’ offices.

While we focus on state-by-state reopening of activities in a responsible manner and based on surveillance data, we note that states may move forward at a county or regional level if these conditions vary within the state and that coordination on reopening among states that share metropolitan regions will be necessary.

Establish Immune Protection and Lift Physical Distancing During Phase III. Physical distancing restrictions and other Phase II measures can be lifted when safe and effective tools for mitigating the risk of COVID-19 are available, including broad surveillance, therapeutics that can rescue patients with significant disease or prevent serious illness in those most at risk, or a safe and effective vaccine.

Rebuild Our Readiness for the Next Pandemic in Phase IV. After we successfully defeat COVID-19, we must ensure that America is never again unprepared to face a new infectious disease threat. This will require investment into research and development initiatives, expansion of public-health and health care infrastructure and workforce, and clear governance structures to execute strong preparedness plans. Properly implemented, the steps described here also provide the foundation for containing the damage that future pathogens may cause.

Phase I: Slow the Spread

Goals

The goal of Phase I is to save lives by:

  1. Slowing the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 across the United States by reducing the effective reproduction number of infections,
  2. Increasing testing capacity to accommodate the ability to test everyone with symptoms and their close contacts, and
  3. Ensuring the health care system has the capacity to safely treat both COVID-19 patients and others requiring care.

A successful Phase I will allow for a significant relaxation of physical distancing measures and a progression to Phase II, when more targeted, case-based interventions are possible.

Thresholds for Action

Trigger to Begin to “Slow the Spread.” The trigger to implement nationwide “slow the spread” measures2 in Phase I is the existence in multiple geographic locations around the country of confirmed cases that cannot be traced back to other known cases (“community spread”).3 This trigger has already been reached in the United States.

Trigger to Move to Phase II. To guard against the risk that large outbreaks or epidemic spread could reignite once we lift our initial efforts to “slow the spread,” the trigger for a move to Phase II should be when a state reports a sustained reduction in cases for at least 14 days (i.e., one incubation period); and local hospitals are safely able to treat all patients requiring hospitalization without resorting to crisis standards of care4; and the capacity exists in the state to test all people with COVID-19 symptoms, along with state capacity to conduct active monitoring of all confirmed cases and their contacts.5

Stay-at-Home Advisories

The trigger for issuing a stay-at-home advisory6 in a US state is when case counts are doubling every three to five days7 (based on the current New York experience) or when state and local officials recommend it based on the local context (for example, growth on track to overwhelm the health system’s capacity).

The trigger for issuing a recommendation to step down from a stay-at-home-advisory back to “slow the spread” is when the number of new cases reported in a state has declined steadily for 14 days (i.e., one incubation period) and the jurisdiction is able to test everyone seeking care for COVID-19 symptoms.

Steps Required in Phase I

Maintain Physical Distancing. Each state must maintain community-level physical distancing measures8 until the threshold for moving to Phase II is met. These Phase I measures include:

  • Closing community gathering spaces such as schools, shopping centers, dining areas, museums, and gyms statewide (places where people congregate indoors);
  • Promoting telework for nonessential employees statewide;
  • Urging the public to limit unnecessary domestic or international travel;
  • Canceling or postponing meetings and mass gatherings;
  • Shutting dining areas but encouraging restaurants to provide takeout and delivery services if possible;
  • Issuing stay-at-home advisories in hot spots where transmission is particularly intense (i.e., when case counts are doubling in a city or locality every three to five days); and
  • Monitoring community adherence to physical distancing and stay-at-home advisories, adjusting risk messaging as appropriate, and identifying alternative incentives for compliance if needed.

Increase Diagnostic Testing Capacity and Build Data Infrastructure for Rapid Sharing of Results. Same-day, point-of-care diagnostic testing (widely available in outpatient settings) is crucial for identifying cases, including those with asymptomatic and mild infections. To move from community-wide interventions that focus on large populations to case-based interventions that target and isolate individual people who are infected, capacity should be sufficient to test:

  1. Hospitalized patients (rapid diagnostics are needed for this population);
  2. Health care workers and workers in essential roles (those in community-facing roles in health and public safety);
  3. Close contacts of confirmed cases; and
  4. Outpatients with symptoms. (This is best accomplished with point-of-care diagnostics in doctors’ offices with guidelines that encourage widespread screening and mandated coverage for testing.)

We estimate that a national capacity of at least 750,000 tests per week would be sufficient to move to case-based interventions when paired with sufficient capacity in supportive public-health infrastructure (e.g., contact tracing).9 In conjunction with more widespread testing, we need to invest in new tools to make it efficient for providers to communicate test results and make data easily accessible to public-health officials working to contain future outbreaks.

Ensure Functioning of the Health Care System. Ensure sufficient critical-care capacity10 in hospitals to be able to immediately expand capacity from 2.8 critical-care beds per 10,000 adults to 5–7 beds per 10,000 adults in the setting of an epidemic or other emergency, allowing for regional variation.11 This target is a minimum, must be adequate for the current and forecasted level of demand, and must be accompanied by adequate staffing. Regional variation in capacity reflecting local needs is acceptable.

Expand access to ventilators in hospitals from 3 per 10,000 adults to a goal of 5–7 ventilators per 10,000 adults.12 This target does not include transport or anesthesia machines. This target is a minimum, must be adequate for the current and forecasted level of demand, and must be accompanied by adequate staffing. Regional variation in capacity reflecting local needs is acceptable.

Maintain access to acute-care hospital beds of at least 30 per 10,000 adults.13 Facilities should have a plan, in the case of a surge in hospital demand, for how the beds would be rapidly flexed from more discretionary uses (e.g., elective procedures) and adequately staffed, with access to adequate supplies of oxygen and other medical supplies.

This health care functioning target would also be met if critical-care and ventilator capacity does not expand to that level but COVID-19 incidence is maintained or falls meaningfully below the state’s capacity to meet critical-care demand. These capacity targets can also be partially met through the availability of ample mobile health care infrastructures (supported and perhaps maintained by federal or state governments) that can be distributed and set up on short notice to hot areas with surge capacity needs.

Increase Supply of Personal Protective Equipment. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends, at a minimum, N95 respirators for hospital staff expected to have direct contact with COVID-19 patients, plus disposable procedural or surgical masks for all other clinical personnel in any health care setting.14 The supply chain should be able to reliably distribute sufficient N95 masks, gloves, and other personal protective equipment to protect health care workers from infection.

Implement Comprehensive COVID-19 Surveillance Systems. The move toward less restrictive physical distancing could precipitate another period of acceleration in case counts. Careful surveillance will be needed to monitor trends in incidence. A high-performing disease surveillance system should be established that leverages:

  1. Widespread and rapid testing at the point of care using cheaper, accessible, and sensitive point-of-care diagnostic tools that are authorized by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA);
  2. Serological testing to gauge background rates of exposure and immunity to inform public-health decision-making about the level of population-based mitigation required to prevent continued spread in the setting of an outbreak; and
  3. A comprehensive national sentinel surveillance system, supported by and coordinated with local public-health systems and health care providers, to track the background rate of infection across states and identify community spread while an outbreak is still small and at a stage in which case-based interventions can prevent a larger outbreak.

ILINet, the surveillance system for influenza-like illness in the United States, is a potential model for SARS-CoV-2 surveillance. To enable rapid and more effective detection and case management, SARS-CoV-2 surveillance will also benefit from data sharing and coordination with health care providers and payers. The CDC should convene an intergovernmental task force, with outside experts as needed and input from states and the health care community, to develop and support a new national surveillance system and data infrastructure for tracking and analyzing COVID-19.

Massively Scale Contact Tracing and Isolation and Quarantine. When a new case of COVID-19 is diagnosed, the patient should be isolated either at home or in a hospital, depending on the level of care he or she requires. Current CDC guidelines recommend seven days of isolation.15 Home isolation can be enforced using technology such as GPS tracking on cell phone apps. Also, the close contacts of confirmed cases (as defined by the CDC16) should be quarantined and monitored daily for 14 days. Monitoring of international travelers is also recommended.17

To scale these interventions to accommodate thousands of daily cases and tens of thousands of daily contacts, public-health infrastructure will need to be dramatically scaled up throughout the country, in coordination with the improving capacity of health care providers to prevent, diagnose, and treat COVID-19 cases.

The task force should also be charged with developing and overseeing an initiative to:

  1. Surge the existing public-health workforce to conduct case finding and contact tracing;
  2. Enable rapid reporting to state, local, and federal health authorities, through the public-health workforce and electronic data sharing from health care providers and labs; and
  3. Develop and field a technological approach to enable rapid data entry, reporting, and support for isolation, quarantine, and safe community-based treatment of affected individuals.

Offer Voluntary Local Isolation and Quarantine. Comfortable, free facilities should be provided for cases and their contacts who prefer local isolation, quarantine, and treatment away from home. For example, a member of a large household may wish to recover in a hotel room that has been repurposed rather than risk infecting family members. Isolation and quarantine away from home should not be mandatory or compelled by force.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead agency tasked with coordinating with state and local jurisdictions to stand up appropriate isolation and quarantine facilities. Field hospitals, dormitories, hotels, and military barracks may be appropriated for this purpose.

Encourage the Public to Wear Masks. There is emerging evidence that asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission of COVID-19 is possible,18 which complicates efforts to pursue case-based interventions. To reduce this risk during Phase I, everyone, including people without symptoms, should be encouraged to wear nonmedical fabric face masks while in public.19

Face masks will be most effective at slowing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 if they are widely used, because they may help prevent people who are asymptomatically infected from transmitting the disease unknowingly. Face masks are used widely by members of the public in some countries that have successfully managed their outbreaks, including South Korea and Hong Kong.20 The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended members of the public use face masks in the event of a severe influenza pandemic.21

However, personal protective equipment should continue to be reserved for health care workers until supplies are sufficient for them and abundant. For this reason, right now members of the general public should opt to wear nonmedical fabric face masks when going out in public. The CDC should issue guidelines on the proper design of such nonmedical fabric face masks. Consumers may be able to fashion these masks themselves using available washable materials, or they may become available in the consumer marketplace.

Trigger for Moving to Phase II

A state can safely proceed to Phase II when it has achieved all the following:

  • A sustained reduction in cases for at least 14 days,
  • Hospitals in the state are safely able to treat all patients requiring hospitalization without resorting to crisis standards of care,22
  • The state is able to test all people with COVID-19 symptoms, and
  • The state is able to conduct active monitoring of confirmed cases and their contacts.23

Phase II: Reopen, State by State

In Phase II, the majority of schools, universities, and businesses can reopen. Teleworking should continue where convenient; social gatherings should continue to be limited to fewer than 50 people wherever possible. Other local restrictions should be considered, such as those that limit people from congregating in close proximity.

High-contact settings such as schools should continue to review and implement physical distancing measures with guidance from the CDC and input from local officials. Health officials should recommend increased social hygiene measures and cleaning of shared surfaces.

For older adults (those over 60 years old), those with underlying health conditions, and other populations at heightened risk from COVID-19, it should still be recommended that they limit time in the community during Phase II. This recommendation may change if an effective therapeutic becomes available.

We need to consider these activities on a coordinated, regional basis through multistate cooperation. While state and local governments maintain sovereignty over issues related to their public-health response, coordination based on regions that cross state boundaries will be crucial. Large states with multiple urban areas and rural regions may implement reopening at a regional level. States that share major metropolitan areas (for example, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) should assure that the conditions for reopening these areas are met across the relevant state boundaries.

Goals

The goals of Phase II are to:

  1. Lift strict physical distancing measures in a concerted and careful fashion,
  2. Allow the vast majority of businesses and schools to open, and
  3. Continue to control SARS-CoV-2 transmission so we do not revert back to Phase I.

The adoption of these Phase II measures will require a careful balance. We will need to constantly reevaluate the implementation of these measures based on available surveillance data, and we will need to be ready to adjust our approach over time according to the epidemiology of local, national, and global spread. This is especially true as we transition from one phase to the next.

Thresholds for Action

Trigger to Lift Physical Distancing Measures. Once the criteria for the transition from Phase I to Phase II have been met and we begin to move away from the “slow the spread” period, leaders at the state level should begin an incremental easing of physical distancing measures. This should be done gradually and should be paired with increased surveillance for new cases. State officials should make decisions about the selection and timing of restrictions to lift based on their local contexts. Restrictions should be eased gradually, with sufficient time between each adjustment to carefully monitor for resurgence of transmission.

Trigger for Returning to Phase I, “Slow the Spread.” As physical distancing is gradually eased, surveillance will be essential for quickly identifying an increase in cases in the state. A state should revert to Phase I and continue “slow the spread” if a substantial number of cases cannot be traced back to known cases, if there is a sustained rise in new cases for five days, or if hospitals in the state are no longer able to safely treat all patients requiring hospitalization.

Trigger for Moving to Phase III. Once a vaccine has been developed, has been tested for safety and efficacy, and receives FDA emergency use authorization,24 or there are other therapeutic options that can be used for preventive or treatment indications and that have a measurable impact on disease activity and can help rescue very sick patients, states can move to Phase III.

Steps Required in Phase II

Implement Case-Based Interventions. Using the public-health capacities developed in Phase I, every confirmed case should be isolated either at home, in a hospital, or (voluntarily) in a local isolation facility for at least seven days, or according to the latest CDC guidance. People awaiting test results should be advised to quarantine until their results are returned.

The close contacts of confirmed cases should be traced and placed under home or central quarantine, with active daily monitoring for at least 14 days, or according to the latest CDC guidance. Diagnostic tests should be immediately administered to any close contacts who develop symptoms.

Begin to Relax Physical Distancing Measures. General physical distancing precautions should still be the norm during Phase II, including teleworking (as much as possible), maintaining hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette, wearing a mask in public, regularly disinfecting high-touch surfaces, and initially limiting social gatherings to fewer than 50 people. These recommendations should be augmented through technological solutions to understand physical distancing behaviors and adjust risk messaging as needed. This should be accomplished through partnerships with the private sector, with careful attention paid to preserving privacy and avoiding coercive means to encourage compliance.

As children return to school and daycare (i.e., high-contact settings) and people return to high-density workplaces, leaders of these organizations should continue to review and implement physical distancing measures based on guidance from the CDC for schools and businesses.25

Special Care for Vulnerable Populations. While easing of physical distancing is taking place, highly vulnerable populations,26 such as individuals older than age 60 and those with compromised immune systems or compromised lung and heart function, should continue to engage in physical distancing as much as possible until a vaccine is available, an effective treatment is available, or there is no longer community transmission. Special attention should be paid to long-term-care facilities and nursing homes.27 These facilities will need to maintain high levels of infection prevention and control efforts and limit visitors to prevent outbreaks.

If a treatment or prophylactic, such as a monoclonal antibody,28 becomes available, high-risk and vulnerable populations should be prioritized to receive it, to both protect those individuals and reduce the likelihood of an increase in severe illnesses and additional patient surge in hospital intensive care units (ICUs).

Accelerate the Development of Therapeutics. Therapeutics play an important role in caring for those who are sick. Accelerating the research, development, production, and distribution of safe and effective therapeutics is a top priority. With effective development strategies and early investments in commercial-scale manufacturing, a successful therapeutic could receive emergency use authorization or approval as early as the summer or fall, if trials demonstrate that it meets either standard.

Therapeutics can serve a number of roles. First, they can serve as a prophylaxis to help prevent infection in those at greatest risk of infection, such as front-line health care workers, or those at risk of bad outcomes, such as individuals with preexisting health conditions and those who are immunocompromised. Such a treatment could include a recombinant antibody that can target the virus surface antigens. As an example, researchers successfully developed such a therapeutic against Ebola. These antibody drugs can also be used to treat early infection or as a postexposure prophylaxis.

Other therapeutics might include antiviral drugs that target features of how the virus replicates. These drugs can be used to treat people who are critically ill or earlier in the course of disease for those at risk of developing a complication. Antiviral drugs can also be used as postexposure prophylaxis, depending on their safety profile. Postexposure prophylaxis and products that shorten the duration and intensity of viral shedding may affect the effective reproduction number only modestly. In addition, immune-modulating treatments may prove to be helpful in mitigating severe lung complications in some patients. A number of promising drugs are in early and mid-stage development.

At a minimum, the optimal profile for a therapeutic that will affect the risk from future spread is one that meaningfully reduces the risk of death or severe disease and perhaps prevents the onset of symptoms or progression to severe disease in those exposed. Oral administration at the outpatient level would be ideal, but alternative administration requirements (e.g., infusion and jet injections) could also be scaled, with sufficient planning.

While private industry has already organized a large task force to share information and capabilities to rapidly advance promising therapies, we need a commensurate focus by federal agencies to make sure the best possible resources are brought to this mission. Federal agencies should join organized efforts already underway in the private sector.

Identify Those Who Are Immune. Serology is a method used to identify evidence of immunity in someone who has recovered from infection. With accurate and widely available serological testing, we can identify people who are immune and therefore no longer vulnerable to infection. While we need to better understand the strength of the immune response in mild cases and how long people remain immune from reinfection, we know there is a period where most people will have sufficient antibodies to offer protection. People who are immune could:

  1. Return to work,
  2. Serve in high-risk roles such as those at the front lines of the health care system, and
  3. Serve in roles that support community functioning for people who are still physically distancing (e.g., the elderly who continue to quarantine at home).

To use serology in this way, serological assays are needed and should be widely available, accurate, rapid, and low cost. Such assays have already been developed by researchers, but they have not yet been fully validated and are not available at scale.

A task force comprised of senior leaders from the CDC, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the Department of Defense (DOD), the FDA, academia, and key private-sector groups (e.g., serological manufacturing companies) should be tasked to oversee the development, production, distribution, data collection, serological survey designs, and analytics for use of serology at scale.29

Trigger for Moving to Phase III

Once a vaccine has been developed, has been tested for safety and efficacy, and receives FDA emergency use authorization,30 states can move to Phase III.

Phase III: Establish Protection Then Lift All Restrictions

Once a robust surveillance sentinel system is in place, coupled with widespread point-of-care testing and a robust ability to implement tracing, isolation, and quarantines—and this is supported by the availability of therapeutics that can help mitigate the risk of spread or reduce serious outcomes in those with infections—or alternatively a vaccine has been developed and tested for safety and efficacy, we can enter Phase III. The availability of these technologies (and eventually a safe and effective vaccine) will have economic and social benefits, in addition to health benefits.

Goals

The goals of safe and effective technologies for controlling transmission are to:

  1. Prevent infection;
  2. Treat those with early disease to prevent bad outcomes;
  3. Provide a prophylaxis for those exposed to infection to prevent them from developing disease or reduce its severity;
  4. In the case of a vaccine, build population-level immunity to the virus in order to reduce illness and death and stop or greatly slow spread; and
  5. Enable the lifting of all physical distancing measures.

Thresholds for Action

Trigger to Begin Manufacturing Scale-Up and Vaccine or Therapeutic Prioritization Planning. As soon as a vaccine or therapeutic looks promising in pivotal clinical trials (i.e., it has been shown to be safe and looks like it will also be effective),31 the US government should work with industry to begin planning for mass manufacturing, distribution, and administration. New provisions enacted under the recently passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act allow for large-scale manufacturing of promising therapies, in advance of approval, to help make sure there will be adequate supply available for mass distribution, should a product demonstrate that it is safe and effective and win regulatory approval.

Trigger for Switch Toward Mass Vaccination. Once availability of a vaccine or therapeutic is able to meet demand, vaccination can expand beyond priority groups. The CDC, state public-health agencies, and vaccine developers should work together to plan for and execute mass vaccination of large populations in the US. This planning can begin before Phase III because preparation can be made regardless of vaccine availability.

Steps to Take in Phase III

Vaccine or Therapeutic Production. Once a safe and effective vaccine or therapeutic has been licensed, it will need to be quickly manufactured at scale. The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures enterprise,32 in coordination with pharmaceutical companies and other private-sector stakeholders, should continue to plan for and implement mass production capable of quickly meeting US demand.

Vaccine or Therapeutic Prioritization—When Supply Is Still Limited. The CDC, the National Institutes of Health, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the DOD, and other stakeholders should revise prior influenza vaccine prioritization guidance to apply specifically to COVID-19.33 The new prioritization guidance for the COVID-19 vaccine should identify priority groups for targeted distribution when a safe and effective vaccine starts to become available. The guidance should be transparent and explain the reasoning for priorities, including the populations in which the vaccine was studied, and should be a phased approach that expands to additional priority groups as vaccine availability expands. The guidance should be reflected in COVID-19 payment policies implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and private insurers, with treatment available at no cost to individuals who meet the priority guidance and a mechanism for reimbursement for individuals who are uninsured.

Mass Vaccination or Therapeutic Distribution—When Supply Is Abundant. The CDC should work with state and local health officials, health care providers, CMS and health insurers, and other public-health stakeholders to create a national plan for how mass vaccination will be carried out across the country. This plan should identify who will administer vaccinations, where vaccines will be offered, and how data will be collected on vaccination rates, as well as possible adverse events from the vaccine. Indemnification of vaccine developers and manufacturers should also be considered. Congress could enact legislation to support a process for compensation of any individual who has an adverse event from the vaccine, which requires medical care.

Global Vaccine Scale-Up and Vaccination. The CDC, the US Agency for International Development, the State Department, and other US stakeholders should continue to work with WHO and other international organizations and national leaders to plan for how the US will assist other countries (particularly low- and middle-income countries) with obtaining vaccine and implementing mass vaccination. Support from the United States and higher-income nations will be critical for controlling the virus globally and saving lives around the world, as well as reducing the impact that future waves of the pandemic may have on the US population.

Serological Surveys to Determine Population Immunity. One key input for understanding the population at risk is the fraction of the population who have recovered and are protected against reinfection. If a sufficiently high fraction of the population has become immune either through natural recovery or vaccination, remaining restrictions can be lifted. The CDC should be the lead agency for coordinating ongoing serological surveys.

Phase IV: Rebuild Our Readiness for the Next Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed serious gaps in our nation’s pandemic preparedness. COVID-19 will not be the last public-health emergency to threaten American society. We must invest in the scientific, public-health, and medical infrastructure needed to prevent, detect, and respond to the next infectious disease threat.

Develop Vaccines for Novel Viruses in Months, Not Years. In response to COVID-19 and in preparation for the next previously unidentified health threat (“Disease X”34), the United States should lead the way by setting an ambitious goal of rapidly developing medical countermeasures for novel or unknown threats in months, not years. A dedicated strategy, program, and funding will be needed to create the ability at existing agencies within the US Department of Health and Human Services and DOD to quickly develop flexible platforms and countermeasures for any type of novel pathogen.35 This strategy should include supporting flexible manufacturing capacity to scale up production to a global level in an emergency.

Modernize and Fortify the Health Care System. We must improve our hospital-bed and ICU capacity to accommodate large surges of patients through public-private partnerships, for example, by enhancing the Hospital Preparedness Program36 and the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement37 and emphasizing preparedness in federal health care programs (e.g., the CMS38 and the Department of Veterans Affairs39). We must also expand the supply chain of personal protective equipment and further the development of crisis standards of care. To reduce future burdens on our critical-care systems, we must also support our primary and community care capabilities to identify populations at elevated risk, detect cases early, and manage them at home or in the community more effectively. Health care payers have been implementing payment reforms to support better screening and population health management. Emergency supplemental payments to health care providers in the current pandemic and future health care payments should be linked to establishing better surge capacity for severe cases and stronger capabilities to partner with public-health authorities to contain outbreaks and reduce the burden on hospitals.

Establish a National Infectious Disease Forecasting Center. Given the important role of infectious disease modeling in supporting public-health decision-making, we should increase our nation’s capacity to use infectious disease modeling40 to support public-health decision-making by establishing a national infectious disease forecasting center. This permanent federal institution would function similarly to the National Weather Service, providing a centralized capability for both producing models and undertaking investigations to improve methods used to advance basic science, data science, and visualization capabilities. It would also provide decision support to public-health agencies based on modeling and analytic results.

Governance. We need to move away from a decentralized system that promotes unequal implementation of preparedness measures across the nation and toward a more coordinated execution of response. We should develop clear and effective plans for the implementation of public-health measures such as quarantine and the unification of actions made by state and local health departments. Outbreaks are matters of regional—and more typically national—concern. Preparedness for public-health emergencies should be elevated as a function in the White House, with a coordinating function analogous to the director of national intelligence.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful for policy input and review of the document by Anita Cicero, JD; Thomas Inglesby, MD; Eric Toner, MD; Elena Martin, MPH; Dylan George, PhD; Jason Asher, PhD; and Trevor Bedford, PhD.

About the Authors

Scott Gottlieb is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and was the Food and Drug Administration commissioner from 2017 to 2019. He serves on the boards of Pfizer Inc. and Illumina.

Mark McClellan, who directs the Duke-Margolis Center for Health Policy, was commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration from 2002 to 2004. He is an independent board member at Alignment Health Care, Cigna, Johnson & Johnson, and Seer. He is a co-chair of the Health Care Payment Learning and Action Network and receives advisory fees from Arsenal Capital, CRG, and Mitre.

Lauren Silvis is a senior vice president at Tempus Inc. and was previously the deputy director of the Food and Drug Administration’s medical device center and the agency’s chief of staff from 2017 to 2019.

Caitlin Rivers is an epidemiologist and assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.

Crystal Watson is a health security expert and assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.

Notes

1. White House, “15 Days to Slow the Spread,” March 16, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread/.

2. White House, “15 Days to Slow the Spread.”

3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “How Coronavirus Spreads,” March 4, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html.

4. Institute of Medicine, Crisis Standards of Care: Summary of a Workshop Series (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK32749/.

5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures: Geographic Risk and Contacts of Laboratory-Confirmed Cases,” March 22, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/risk-assessment.html.

6. Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu, and Vanessa Swales, “See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home,” New York Times, March 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html.

7. Qun Li et al., “Early Transmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel Coronavirus–Infected Pneumonia,” New England Journal of Medicine 382 (March 2020): 1199–207, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2001316.

8. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures.”

9. During the 2017–18 flu season (which was particularly severe), there were 18,000,000–27,000,000 medical visits for influenza-like illness spread out over approximately 32 weeks, averaging 562,000–844,000 visits per week. However, those visits were not evenly distributed throughout the season, and peak demand was higher, so we estimate a national capacity of approximately 750,000 would meet demand. South Korea has tested 1 in 170 people, cumulatively. To do the same, we would need to test 1.9 million people, which we could achieve in around 2.5 weeks with a capacity of 750,000/week.

10. Neil A. Halpern and Kay See Tan, “U.S. ICU Resource Availability for COVID-19,” Society of Critical Care Medicine, March 25, 2020, https://sccm.org/getattachment/Blog/March-2020/United-States-Resource-Availability-for-COVID-19/United-States-Resource-Availability-for-COVID-19.pdf.

11. Preliminary research suggests that a Wuhan-like outbreak in the United States would require 2.1 to 4.9 critical care beds per 10,000 adults. However, a majority of those beds are in use for non-COVID-19 patients requiring critical care for other conditions. We estimate that approximately 5–7 beds per 10,000 adults would accommodate both patient groups. Ruoran Li et al., “The Demand for Inpatient and ICU Beds for COVID-19 in the US: Lessons from Chinese Cities” (working paper, March 16, 2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.09.20033241v2.full.pdf.

12. Halpern and See Tan, “U.S. ICU Resource Availability for COVID-19.”

13. Halpern and See Tan, “U.S. ICU Resource Availability for COVID-19.”

14. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings,” March 19, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/infection-control/control-recommendations.html.

15. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Discontinuation of Home Isolation for Persons with COVID-19 (Interim Guidance),” March 16, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/disposition-in-home-patients.html.

16. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures.”

17. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Travelers Returning from International Travel,” March 27, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/after-travel-precautions.html.

18. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Healthcare Professionals: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,” March 22, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/faq.html.

19. Shuo Feng et al., “Rational Use of Face Masks in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Lancet, March 20, 2020, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanres/article/PIIS2213-2600(20)30134-X/fulltext.

20. Kylie E. C. Ainslie et al., “Report 11: Evidence of Initial Success for China Exiting COVID-19 Social Distancing Policy After Achieving Containment,” Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, March 24, 2020, https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-Exiting-Social-Distancing-24-03-2020.pdf.

21. World Health Organization, Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Measures for Mitigating the Risk and Impact of Epidemic and Pandemic Influenza, 2019, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/329438/9789241516839-eng.pdf.

22. Institute of Medicine, Crisis Standards of Care.

23. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures.”

24. Feng et al., “Rational Use of Face Masks in the COVID-19 Pandemic.”

25. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Schools, Workplaces & Community Locations,” March 21, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/index.html.

26. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness,” March 26, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html.

27. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Preparing for COVID-19: Long-Term Care Facilities, Nursing Homes,” March 21, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/healthcare-facilities/prevent-spread-in-long-term-care-facilities.html.

28. National Cancer Institute, “NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms,” s.v. “monoclonal antibody,” https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/monoclonal-antibody.

29. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Coronavirus (COVID-19),” https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html; US Department of Health and Human Services, “BARDA’s Novel Coronavirus Medical Countermeasure Portfolio,” March 25, 2020, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/events/COVID19/Pages/BARDA.aspx; National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/; US Department of Defense, “Coronavirus: DOD Response,” https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/; and US Food and Drug Administration, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/counterterrorism-and-emerging-threats/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19.

30. US Food and Drug Administration, “Emergency Use Authorization,” https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization.

31. US Food and Drug Administration, “Step 3: Clinical Research,” https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research#Clinical_Research_Phase_Studies.

32. US Department of Health and Human Services, “Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise,” January 29, 2020, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Pages/default.aspx.

33. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Interim Updated Planning Guidance on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Influenza Vaccine During an Influenza Pandemic, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/2018-Influenza-Guidance.pdf.

34. World Health Organization, “Prioritizing Diseases for Research and Development in Emergency Contexts,” https://www.who.int/activities/prioritizing-diseases-for-research-and-development-in-emergency-contexts.

35. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Health Security, Vaccine Platforms: State of the Field and Looming Challenges, 2019, http://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2019/190423-OPP-platform-report.pdf.

36. US Department of Health and Human Services, “Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP),” https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/Pages/default.aspx.

37. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement,” March 27, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/readiness/phep.htm.

38. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Partner Toolkit,” March 27, 2020, https://www.cms.gov/outreach-education/partner-resources/coronavirus-covid-19-partner-toolkit.

39. US Department of Veterans Affairs, “Coronavirus FAQs: What Veterans Need to Know,” https://www.va.gov/coronavirus-veteran-frequently-asked-questions/.

40. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Health Security, Modernizing and Expanding Outbreak Science to Support Better Decision Making During Public Health Crises: Lessons for COVID-19 and Beyond, 2020, http://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2020/200324-outbreak-science.pdf.

Scott Gottlieb

Scott Gottlieb

Resident Fellow


How Will We Know When It’s Time to Reopen the Nation?: Experts offer four benchmarks that can serve as a guide for cities and states, eliminating some of the guesswork. By Aaron E. Carroll

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/upshot/coronavirus-four-benchmarks-reopening.html

April 6, 2020 Updated April 11, 2020


Times Square on Friday. Angela Weiss/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Everyone wants to know when we are going to be able to leave our homes and reopen the United States. That’s the wrong way to frame it.

The better question is: “How will we know when to reopen the country?”

Any date that is currently being thrown around is just a guess. It’s pulled out of the air.

To this point, Americans have been reacting, often too late, and rarely with data. Most of us are engaging in social distancing because leaders have seen what’s happening in Europe or in New York; they want to avoid getting there; and we don’t have the testing available to know where coronavirus hot spots really are.

Since the virus appears to be everywhere, we have to shut everything down. That’s unlikely to be the way we’ll exit, though.

Some cities or states will recover sooner than others. It’s helpful to have criteria by which cities or states could determine they’re ready. A recent American Enterprise Institute report by Scott Gottlieb, Caitlin Rivers, Mark B. McClellan, Lauren Silvis and Crystal Watson staked out some goal posts.

  • Hospitals in the state must be able to safely treat all patients requiring hospitalization, without resorting to crisis standards of care.

Other cities and states fear that they will approach New York City’s state of crisis. They’re trying to increase the number of available beds and ventilators — as well as doctors, nurses and other health care providers — to make sure they aren’t overwhelmed in their capacity to provide care to all those who need it.

This is the most immediate bar, and the focus of most public health officials’ attention. At the moment, there’s no reason to believe any area is over a surge of cases, and analysts’ models predict many places won’t peak for weeks to come.

  • A state needs to be able to at least test everyone who has symptoms.

Dr. Gottlieb and colleagues estimate that the nation would need to have the capacity to run 750,000 tests a week — this is after things have calmed down greatly. There are times we might need even more.

“The 750,000 number should be viewed as a reasonable expectation for when we haven’t been having any major pockets or regional outbreaks to manage,” said Mark McClellan, an author of the report and a professor of business, medicine and policy at Duke. “If more testing to help contain outbreaks and potential outbreaks is needed, which seems very plausible, especially early on, the number would need to be significantly larger. We’ll also have to do some surveillance of people without symptoms, especially in higher-risk settings.”

A national estimate means less in deciding whether a state can reopen than its local capabilities. A state would need to be sure it could test every single person who might be infected, and have the results in a timely manner. That would be the only way to achieve the next requirement.

  • The state is able to conduct monitoring of confirmed cases and contacts.

A robust system of contact tracing and isolation is the only thing that can prevent an outbreak and a resulting lockdown from recurring. Every time an individual tests positive, the public health infrastructure needs to be able to determine whom that person has been in close contact with, find those people, and have them go into isolation or quarantine until it’s established they aren’t infected, too.

This will be a big challenge for most areas. Other countries have relied on cellphone tracking technology to determine whom people have been near. We don’t have anything like that ready, nor is it even clear we’d allow it. The United States also doesn’t have enough people working in public health in many areas to carry out this task.

Building that capacity will take significant time and money, and the country hasn’t even started.

  • There must be a sustained reduction in cases for at least 14 days.

Because it can take up to two weeks for symptoms to emerge, any infections that have already happened can take that long to appear. If the number of cases in an area is dropping steadily for that much time, however, public health officials can be reasonably comfortable that suppression has been achieved, defined by every infected person infecting fewer than one other.

In suppression, cases will dwindle at an exponential fashion, just as they rose. It’s not possible to set a benchmark number for every state because the number of infections that will be manageable in any area depends on the local population and the public health system’s ability to handle sporadic cases.

“We wanted to suggest criteria that would allow locations to safely and thoughtfully begin to reopen, but what that looks like exactly will vary from state to state,” said Caitlin Rivers, another author of the report and an epidemiologist at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. “We therefore included some flexibility for jurisdictions to tailor these criteria to their local context.”

These four criteria are a baseline. Other experts think we will need to add serological testing, which is different from the viral detection going on now. This type of testing looks for antibodies in the blood that our bodies created to fight the infection, not the infection itself. These tests can be much cheaper and faster than the ones we’re currently using to detect the virus in sick people.

Testing for antibodies will tell us how many people in a community have already been infected, as opposed to currently infected, and may also provide information about future immunity.

Gregg Gonsalves, a professor of epidemiology and law at Yale, said: “I’d feel better if we had serological testing, and could preferentially allow those who are antibody positive and no longer infectious to return to work first. The point is, though, that we are nowhere even near accomplishing any of these criteria. Opening up before then will be met with a resurgence of the virus.”

He added, “That’s the thing that keeps me up every night.”

Until we get a vaccine or effective drug treatments, focusing on these major criteria, and directing efforts toward them, should help us determine how we are progressing locally, and how we might achieve each goal.

It would also prevent us from offering false hope about when America can start reopening. Instead of guesses, people could have clear answers about when they might be able to go back to a closer-to-normal way of life.


Times Square on New Year’s 2020. Angel Colmenares/EPA, via Shutterstock

Aaron E. Carroll is a professor of pediatrics at Indiana University School of Medicine and the Regenstrief Institute who blogs on health research and policy at The Incidental Economist and makes videos at Healthcare Triage. He is the author ofThe Bad Food Bible: How and Why to Eat Sinfully.” @aaronecarroll

How to reopen America safely, but soon By Steve Hilton

Source: https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/steve-hilton-how-to-reopen-america-safely-but-soon

April 13, 2020



The coronavirus has left death and devastation in its wake. But as we've said since the beginning, this shutdown costs lives, too, and here's the toll.

More than 1 in 10 Americans thrown out of work, higher taxes to come, businesses collapsing, mental health declining, poverty rising and with it, life expectancy falling. We're hearing that there was pushback against the shutdown in early February.

Of course, there was and quite right, too. President Trump's instincts on this have been right all along. He's the one that has to consider all the implications of any decision, including the social, economic, and yes, public health devastation of a shutdown.

As the shutdown toll grows, so has the demand for a better, more sustainable antivirus plan. We've said it different ways, but it's all the same thing: Reopen America safely, but soon.

I've read the ideas that are out there for how we move out of shutdown. Frankly, none of them makes sense, except the one put together by a world-renowned team of scientists and entrepreneurs that we will present to you.

First, let's get the bad ideas out of the way. The central truth of our current situation is that it's not just as I said a few weeks ago, that the cure is worse than the disease. This cure is not even a cure.

The minute you lift the lockdowns, the virus starts spreading again, whether that's May, June, July, August or Christmas. That's the central floor in the first bad idea for reopening. Lift the lockdown now but reapply it until we get a vaccine.

MSNBC's Zeke Emanuel talks about shutdown 2.0, 3.0, 4.0. How about, just "no." Anyone pushing the recurring shutdown idea has no clue about how the economy actually works. Uncertainty is a killer for business, for consumers and for workers. We need to reopen and stay open.

Another terrible idea is the one we told you about last week. Governments in Europe are looking at immunity passports or certificates for those who've had coronavirus. Our own Dr. Fauci said on Friday that immunity certificates, "might actually have some merit under certain circumstances."

Again, no. This has no merit under any circumstances. Of course, we respect Dr. Fauci's medical expertise, but this is a policy idea that would be an Orwellian nightmare, like the past laws they had in South Africa at the height of apartheid.

To be effective, to bring certainty to business, to maximize our chances of getting that big bounce-back recovery working Americans so desperately need, the right plan to reopen America has to be safe, of course, based on science, but also simple.

Government antibody surveillance, leading to antibody passes would create a class of zero positive elites, and an incentive for people desperate for work to get infected. I hope no one in the White House is wasting one second on such a monstrous inhuman scheme. It would be totally unacceptable to the American people, let alone Trump supporters.

Another example of technocratic hubris is the plan being pushed by former FDA head Scott Gottlieb. This is the one the establishment group seems to be coalescing around. So that alone should make you suspicious of it.

As part of a comically complicated scheme with different phases and benchmarks for different parts of the country, this plan would use mass virus testing, not antibody testing -- as Dr. Fauci puts it, to identify, isolate, contact, trace everyone who gets the virus.

But the latest data tells us that many millions of Americans have or will get the virus. The idea that the government can identify each of them, isolate them somewhere for weeks, trace all their contacts -- it's insane.

And now we know that Apple and Google are right behind it, ready to build their surveillance empires on the back of this crisis. Let's call it the Gottlieb-Apple-Google plan or "GAG" for short. It's a technocrat's dream and America's nightmare. No.

To be effective, to bring certainty to business, to maximize our chances of getting that big bounce-back recovery working Americans so desperately need, the right plan to reopen America has to be safe, of course, based on science, but also simple. That's the plan we'll present to you.

And here are the people who put it together. Stanford University Professor of Epidemiology, Dr. John Ioannidis; Stanford Associate Professor of Population Health, Eran Bendavid, and joining us live, Stanford University Professor of Medicine, Dr. Jay Bhattacharya; biophysicist and medical investor, Dr. Andrew Bogan, and entrepreneur and the founder of JetBlue, David Neeleman.

Uncertainty is a killer for business, for consumers and for workers. We need to reopen and stay open.

Here are the key elements of their plan, and we should be clear that it is intended to go into full effect, May 1st, after the current White House guidelines expire.

Step one: Get accurate data about how widespread and how deadly coronavirus really is. The statistics we're seeing right now are totally wrong. They reflect the number of tests, not the real number of infections.

To get the real number, the Stanford team has just carried out the world's first large scale community antibody sample survey right here in the Bay Area where I'm speaking to you from, Santa Clara County. It was the first in the nation to identify community transmission of coronavirus. The official statistics claim there are about 1,600 cases of coronavirus here.

Based on early indications and similar testing elsewhere, the actual number could be much, much higher. That means coronavirus is much more contagious but much less deadly than we've been told.

So, here's recommendation one: Instead of pursuing government antibody surveillance for every American, the White House should immediately commission continuous community antibody sampling nationwide, so we get a true picture of the spread of this virus.

Second step: Get accurate data about who is most vulnerable. Just saying the elderly and those with underlying health conditions is too vague. How old? Which health conditions? How severe? How much virus were they exposed to? That is a huge part of this story. That is why young people like some of our health care heroes are dying, despite being in good health.

Don't waste time identifying, isolating and contact tracing everyone who has got the virus. The latest data shows there are multiple millions of them, and the vast majority will be fine. Instead, put the effort into tracing the medical histories of the people who so tragically died.

Unbelievably, our hospitals are not collecting that data. So, there's the second recommendation: The White House should mandate the collection and publication of what's known as, "morbidity data" -- detailed information about the health conditions of coronavirus fatalities. This is especially important.

Now, we know more about how this virus is transmitted. Early guidance was wrong and dangerous, focusing on surface transmission, hand washing, face touching and so on. We now know the virus can be passed on through airborne droplets that can be breathed in.

So it's likely that the shutdowns actually hurt the most vulnerable, infected, but asymptomatic people were sent back to multigenerational homes into close quarters with their elderly family members. We need better data on infection rates, better data on risk factors. That's what the next few weeks should be about.

Then we go to step three in this science-based plan: Reopen America all at once, not bit by bit. Quarantine and protect the truly vulnerable. If we know that millions more Americans than we thought have already had coronavirus, we don't need to shut down the economy just for a lack of ventilators to take care of the truly vulnerable.

With the information gathered in steps one and two of this plan, we can do a much better job of protecting them. Quarantine the most vulnerable -- not everyone, not even everyone over 65, just those with the specific health risks that have tragically killed thousands already. Keep them inside, give them N-95 masks and make sure no one comes within six feet of them.

Make sure local health services contact and support them, mobilize food banks to help them. Impose much tighter controls in nursing homes and continue to build our reserves of ventilators and PPE to make sure we can cope with anything that comes down the line.

Look, it might be a while before we can fill up a football stadium, but the science-based plan we've outlined for you is simple, it is practical and it is the best way to reopen America safely, but soon.

Adapted from Steve Hilton's monologue from "The Next Revolution" on April 12, 2020.

Wednesday, April 22, 2020

The Ventilator Shortage That Wasn’t By Kyle Smith




April 17, 2020

The ventilator shortages of which we were all gravely warned have not yet come to pass.

In March, one of the most feared aspects of the pandemic was the widely reported coming shortage of ventilators. One well-publicized estimate, repeated by the New York Times, the New Yorker and CNN, was that the U.S. would need roughly one million ventilators, or more than five times as many as we had. Gulp. Ventilators are expensive, they’re complex machines, and they can’t be churned out in the thousands overnight.

In the state that (as of today) has one-third of the country’s confirmed COVID-19 cases, New York governor Andrew Cuomo sounded the alarm for ventilators repeatedly. On March 27, he acknowledged “I don’t have a crystal ball” but said his state desperately needed 30,000 ventilators, maybe 40,000, but had only 12,000. When President Trump noted that Cuomo’s state had thousands of unused ventilators it hadn’t even placed yet, Cuomo admitted this was true but said he still needed more: “Yes, they’re in a stockpile because that’s where they’re supposed to be because we don’t need them yet. We need them for the apex,” Cuomo said at the time. On April 2, Cuomo predicted the state would run out of ventilators in six days “at the current burn rate.” But on April 6, Cuomo noted, “We’re ok, and we have some in reserve.”

Now New York appears to have passed the apex. Deaths, a lagging indicator, crested at 799 on April 9 and hit 606 on April 16, the lowest figure since April 6. Hospitalizations are also declining, and on April 16 also hit their lowest level since April 6. Cuomo today has so many ventilators he is giving them away: On April 15, he said he was sending 100 of them to Michigan and 50 to Maryland. On April 16, he announced he was sending 100 to New Jersey.

New Jersey has by far the most cases outside of New York, with 75,000 positive tests. It also has by far the most deaths outside of New York: 3,518 as of April 16. However, New Jersey, with 8,011 total hospitalizations as of April 16, also has more ventilators than it is currently using and also may have passed its apex; as of April 16, the fewest New Jerseyans were on ventilators since April 8. So far, the peak was April 14, when 1705 patients were on ventilators. Yet before Cuomo’s announcement, New Jersey reported that 46 percent of its ventilators were still available.

Michigan, the fifth-hardest-hit state after Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, may or may not have had its worst day. So far its worst daily death toll was 205 on April 10, but its second-highest total was 172 on April 16. The number of new cases reported fell slightly from a peak on April 14. But Michigan isn’t even using most of its ventilators yet: As of April 16, it reported 1,232 ventilators were being used but 1,754 more were available. So New York’s surplus is at the moment adding to the Michigan surplus.

Maryland, which was sent 50 ventilators by California recently before Cuomo offered to send them 50 more, appears to be right around its apex; deaths hit a record high of 47 on April 15, then dropped slightly each of the next two days. I couldn’t find any stats about ventilators on the state’s COVID-19 website. The state’s largest paper, the Baltimore Sun, appears not to have run any pieces discussing feared ventilator shortages since late March. On March 25, Gov. Larry Hogan said the state had received a shipment of FEMA ventilators and said it was “not enough” without divulging numbers. Hogan appears not to have said anything about ventilators lately except for last Sunday, when he said President Trump was “not quite accurate” when he claimed governors were in good shape regarding medical equipment. “Everybody still has tremendous needs on personal protective equipment and ventilators and all of these things that you keep hearing about,” Hogan said, without being specific.

Three weeks ago, President Trump was mocked and ridiculed for downplaying the need for more ventilators. “I have a feeling that a lot of the numbers that are being said in some areas are just bigger than they’re going to be,” Trump said on March 27. “I don’t believe you need 40,000 or 30,000 ventilators,” he added, referring to Cuomo’s estimate for New York state. Cuomo and New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio and others said they had “facts” on their side. Said De Blasio, “When the president says the state of New York doesn’t need 30,000 ventilators, with all due respect to him, he’s not looking at the facts of this astronomical growth of this crisis. And a ventilator . . . means someone lives or dies.”

NPR ran a strange piece casting these rival predictions as matters of fact also: “FACT CHECK: N.Y. Governor Slams Trump Ventilator Claim As ‘Ignorant’ And ‘Uninformed.’” Well, yes, it’s a fact that the governor expressed those opinions, but NPR doesn’t ordinarily fact-check opinions. NPR couldn’t fact-check the future in this “FACT CHECK,” and didn’t. The ventilator shortages of which we were all gravely warned have not yet come to pass. If we have indeed reached the crest of the crisis, perhaps they won’t.

Kyle Smith is National Review’s critic-at-large.


How the Media Completely Blew the Trump Ventilator Story By Rich Lowry

Source: https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/04/coronavirus-response-ventilators-trump-administration-handled-potential-shortage-deftly/

April 19, 2020

The administration handled the potential shortage deftly.

At a coronavirus-task-force briefing at the beginning of April, White House adviser Jared Kushner explained the approach that would — as events proved — get the country through its ventilator crisis.

He was relentlessly pilloried, mocked, and distorted in the press for it.

After nearly four years of unrelieved Trump hysteria in the media, it’s hard to rank the worst journalistic outrages, but how Kushner’s remarks were misreported and misinterpreted belongs high on the list.

Much of the press coverage and subsequent commentary focused on one sentence at that April 2 briefing: “The notion of the federal stockpile was it’s supposed to be our stockpile. It’s not supposed to be states’ stockpiles that they then use.”

Cue the outrage. As CNBC put it, correctly, in a headline, “Jared Kushner slammed for saying the federal medical supply stockpile isn’t meant for states.”

The blue-checkmarks on Twitter descended in force. Representative Ted Lieu tweeted, “Dear Jared Kushner of the @realDonaldTrump: We are the UNITED STATES of America. The federal stockpile is reserved for all Americans living in our states not just federal employees. Get it?”

Former director of the United States Office of Government Ethics Walter Shaub thundered, “Who the hell does the nepotist think ‘our’ refers to? It is for the American people.”

Partisan outlets piled on. “Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and White House adviser,” Salon wrote, “claimed that the federal stockpile of medical supplies is not for individual states to ‘use,’ even though that is exactly the reason why the stockpile exists.”

And so did mainstream outlets. ABC News rapped Kushner for his “inaccurate description” of the stockpile, which “actually is intended for states’ use.”

In a piece for The New Yorker, Susan Glasser went even further. She wrote that the press briefing “will surely go down as one of the Administration’s most callous performances.” It was symptomatic, she argued, of a federal response that was a “failure by design — not a problem to be fixed but a policy choice by President Trump that either would not or could not be undone.”

All of this was completely ridiculous and wrong. With even a little context, it was obvious what Kushner was saying: States shouldn’t be drawing on the federal stockpile just to hold ventilators in their own reserves while hard-pressed cities were running low.

This was obvious from the very next sentence from Kushner: “So we’re encouraging the states to make sure that they’re assessing the needs, they’re getting the data from their local — local situations and then trying to fill it with the supplies that we’ve given them.”

The proximate reason for Kushner’s comment about the state stockpiles was a dispute between the Trump administration and New York governor Andrew Cuomo. New York City was running out of ventilators. The administration had sent 4,400 but learned that 2,000 of them were being held by the state and hadn’t made their way to the city.

The controversial sentence was part of a long answer setting out the administration’s strategy on ventilators that has, despite all the hue and cry, clearly worked. The emphasis — with Jared Kushner and his team in the middle of it, and capable leadership from Rear Admiral John Polowczyk at FEMA and Admiral Brett Giroir at HHS — was on data and shrewd allocation, so that ventilators did not go to states simply on request.

There’s no doubt that the lockdowns, in bending the curve of cases downward, have played a role in averting any shortage — one of the points of the lockdowns in the first place, of course. But there was no guarantee that we would get to this place where we are today, with ventilators no longer a significant worry.

At the outset, the country was looking at a daunting, perhaps impossible challenge. A chilling briefing at FEMA early on posited that the U.S. could be short 130,000 ventilators by April 1. The federal government had about 16,000 ventilators on hand in its stockpile and several thousand more from the Veteran’s Administration and the Department of Defense.

It was possible the government could perform at the highest level — and still fall short. A couple of insights drove the administration’s effort to get its arms around the problem.

Officials realized, as one White House adviser puts it, that there was “too much guesstimating” going on. New York, for instance, said it needed 40,000 ventilators. Then, the administration interrogated the request. What was that based on? It’s coming from public-health officials. Okay, how are they getting that number? Models. Plus, we don’t want to be short.

It became clear that many governors didn’t know how many ventilators their states had, and they were driven by early models that were “doomsday scenarios,” as one senior administration official puts it. Governors were also acting on the normal impulse to want to be safe, and have more than enough ventilators on hand, just in case. “If you are a governor, which is natural, you are going to over-ask because you want to be over-prepared,” the official explains.

A data team drawn from various government agencies and at the White House was created to get to the truth on the ground. It used hospital billings at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to estimate how many ventilators were in each state and how many were being utilized on any day, giving administration officials a more granular picture of what was happening in states than many governors had themselves.

Another important realization was that FEMA could do just-in-time delivery. It could get states and hospitals ventilators within 24 or 48 hours. This created a lot of flexibility. The administration could wait to see how things really played out rather than making decisions based on models that forecast what the demand might be two weeks in the future. “When you started looking at it like that,” the official says, “the numbers went down dramatically.”

And this is the key thing: The strategy was based on not sending states what they requested on their say-so. That was the opposite of the normal FEMA operating procedure. Usually, state and counties ask for things in a natural disaster, and FEMA sends them along as a matter of course. With an epidemic threatening the entire country, that way of doing things would have exhausted the federal resources immediately.

This also meant that much of the press coverage get it exactly backward. The media portrayed as an inherent failure the fact that the administration gave states a portion of their requests. (“Trump sent Arizona a fraction of the ventilators it sought,” a Vox headline said. “Republicans still framed it as a big win.”) In reality, not giving governors what they wanted was integral to the success of the overall operation.

If, for instance, the administration had tried to fulfill New York’s initial stated need for 40,000 ventilators, everything would have gone out the door to New York, and for no good reason. There was immense political pressure to send the ventilators anyway, although it would have been a mistake. “In the moment, that wasn’t 100 percent clear,” says the senior administration official. “There was a lot of pressure to send them all, because the pressure is basically, ‘How is it going to look if you’re holding in a stockpile and people need them?’”

None of this is to say there weren’t real needs in New York and New Jersey. Some 8,000 ventilators were sent out from the reserve, many of them to those two places, which were at times operating on very thin margins.

Another insight was that most ventilators out in the country weren’t being used, since the virus hot-spots were geographically limited. That meant there was a tremendous capacity to be tapped. This led to the Dynamic Ventilator Reserve. States and hospitals with a safe margin of ventilators not in use could lend them to places that needed them.

The lubricant for the system was a federal guarantee that a hospital lending a ventilator would get a replacement in 24 or 48 hours if it turned out that it needed it back. This removed the fear and the risk of giving up ventilators. It also allowed the administration to effectively leverage in the here and now the ventilators that it will have in the future, when production ramps up. “A ventilator today is more valuable than a future ventilator,” the White House adviser explains.

As for the future ventilators, FEMA acted quickly — much faster than is possible in the regular process — to get so-called notifications to purchase to ventilator manufacturers, so they could start work and hold their inventory, which ensured it wasn’t lost to foreign countries. The Defense Production Act was invoked with General Motors to get production moving as quickly as possible, and not back-loaded later in the summer.

Last year, according to administration figures, the country produced 30,000 ventilators. This year, it’s going to produce something on the order of 200,000, and they are already coming in. “The balance now is growing daily,” the White House adviser says of the federal stockpile. “We are going to be swimming in ventilators.”

By any measure, that’s a success, certainly compared with where we thought we’d be less than a month ago. If the media weren’t so devoted to gotcha idiocy, more people might know about it.

Rich Lowry is the editor of National Review

Wednesday, April 01, 2020

Jersey Shore pizzeria owner takes out loan to pay workers: 'Without your employees, you don't have a business' By Charles Creitz


Source: https://www.foxnews.com/media/jersey-shore-pizzeria-owner-loan-pay-workers

March 23, 2020

A Jersey Shore pizza shop owner has made the ultimate commitment to his employees as the Garden State's economy grapples with restrictions put in place to counter the coronavirus outbreak.

Bryan Morin, the owner of Federico's Pizzeria & Restaurant in Belmar, opened a $50,000 line of credit in order to continue paying his employees.

"It just seemed like the right thing to do," Morin told "Tucker Carlson Tonight". "I didn't want them to worry about me paying my mortgage, I didn't want these guys ... [to] have to worry about paying their rent, their utilities and insurance and other stuff."

Morin added that many of his employees have been with him for more than a decade and have essentially become members of his family.

Carlson said the restaurateur's action was "heroic," but noted that Federico's is not yet shut down, but rather forced to serve customers through takeout or delivery only

Morin said the line of credit is a security blanket of sorts in the event of a worst-case scenario.

"I took that money out just in case they did shut us down ... Currently, we are still working, but who knows, maybe one of the employees actually gets the virus and then we will be forced to close and self-quarantine for 14 days," Morin said.

"I just took this out to guarantee that my employees, no matter what, they'll continue to be able to pay their bills. You've got to take care of your employees. Without your employees, you don't have a business."

Pizzeria borrows to keep workers on job, spurs donations By Wayne Parry

Source: https://apnews.com/59d1ce33192a45f559e3d08cc7476e55

March 29, 2020

In this March 26, 2020 photo provided by Maureen Morin and Federico's Pizza, staff members of the Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore University Medical Center give a thumbs-up in Neptune City, N.J., as they eat a donated meal from the Belmar, New Jersey pizzeria. With restaurants closed for all but takeout orders during the coronavirus outbreak, the owners of the pizzeria could have shut down and laid off their 20 employees. Instead, the business's owners took out a $50,000 line of credit and guaranteed their workers they'll stay on the payroll for at least two months. (Courtesy of Maureen Morin via AP)


BELMAR, N.J. (AP) — This is a story about bosses and their workers, in the dark days of COVID-19. It’s also a story about how one good turn deserves another and yet another.

And this being New Jersey, it’s also a story about pizza.

Bryan Morin and his brother Michael operate Federico’s Pizza in this Jersey Shore town. In the summer, they deliver cheese steak pizzas and 12-inch subs and garlic knots directly to the beach, a few blocks away. In winter, customers flock to the cozy, black-and-white tiled restaurant on Main Street.

But across the ocean, trouble brewed. Bryan Morin tossed and turned all night after watching news reports of how a virus spread rapidly in Italy, eventually bringing life to a virtual standstill and leading to massive layoffs as businesses closed down.

He could not let this happen at Federico’s.

Many of his employees have been with the business for a decade or more; the head cook has been there for 22 years, since the business was owned by Bryan and Michael’s father.

“I’m the provider for my employees; I supply their salary, and if they don’t have a salary, they won’t be able to afford their rent, their credit card bills, their insurance, their gas,” he said.

He decided to “do the right thing and take the hit, and I’ll make it up somewhere down the line.”



So about two weeks ago, he secured a $50,000 line of credit from his bank. He promised his workers they’d have a job for at least the next two months, come what may. He’d reassess conditions after that, but he’d do everything possible to keep the paychecks flowing.

As word of the brothers’ pledge got around, the community rallied round. Customers began helping out: an extra $10 on top of the usual 20% tip, a few bucks earmarked for the kitchen staff.

But then, something unexpected happened -- a surge of pay-it-forward donations.

People -- some who were ordering food, some who just wanted to help -- called and asked the pizzeria to charge their credit cards for food to be sent to those on the front lines of the virus response: Doctors, nurses and other staff at a nearby hospital, police, firefighters and EMS squads.

In just two days last week, Federico’s took in nearly $4,000 to make and deliver pizzas to first responders. Moments before Bryan Morin was interviewed last week, the pizzeria sent 30 free pizzas to Jersey Shore Medical Center, a vital battleground in the fight against COVID-19 in a state that has the second-most cases in the nation.

All because the boss cared.

“This is such a scary time, and so many people are getting laid off,” said Kirsten Phillips, who works the counter. “It was so unexpected what he did, but maybe it shouldn’t have been, because he always took care of us. This is really the best job I’ve ever had.”

___

While nonstop global news about the effects of the coronavirus have become commonplace, so, too, are the stories about the kindness of strangers and individuals who have sacrificed for others. “One Good Thing” is an AP continuing series reflecting these acts of kindness.

___

Associated Press religion coverage receives support from the Lilly Endowment through the Religion News Foundation. The AP is solely responsible for this content.

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Follow Wayne Parry at http://twitter.com/WayneParryAC


N.J. mattress and tablecloth companies flip to making medical masks for health care workers By Rodrigo Torrejon

Source: https://www.nj.com/coronavirus/2020/03/nj-mattress-and-tablecloth-companies-flip-to-making-medical-masks-for-health-care-workers.html

Mar 25, 2020




In the age of a pandemic, what do a North Brunswick mattress company and a Paterson tablecloth factory have in common?

Both companies have decided to use their expertise to start making medical masks, fighting the dwindling supply of the critically needed and potentially life-saving masks for healthcare workers on the frontlines of the coronavirus outbreak in New Jersey.

At its North Brunswick factory, mattress manufacturer Eclipse International will pivot from making mattresses to producing an initial batch of 38,000 masks, with plans to donate all the masks to healthcare workers who have been pleading for more supplies of protective gear. The first batch will be donated to the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital, in New Brunswick, according to a statement.

The switch started when Stuart Carlitz, president and CEO of Eclipse International, watched a grim report of a shortage of the masks and realized much of the same materials were used for the mattresses he had been making for years.

“This all started Friday morning when I heard Governor Cuomo in New York talk about the fact that they were out of masks and scrambling to find them and that they were actually paying much higher prices than what masks were being sold for weeks earlier," said Stuart Carlitz, president and CEO of Eclipse International. “My first thought was that’s really terrible that people would take advantage of this time to profit.”

Looking down at masks his wife had given him to protect himself, Carlitz saw that one of the materials used in the mask were the same as in the mattresses: an Elite nonwoven fabric textile.

After ordering materials the company didn’t have, including elastic, the company is set to produce the three-layer masks, Carlitz said.

“I started researching on the internet for designs,” he said. “Sourcing the materials that I needed. We got our first delivery of elastic Monday morning. We immediately made several prototype masks.”

Additional materials came in Tuesday, with production expected to ramp up this week.

In Paterson, at the Tablecloth Company, which makes — you guessed it — table clothes, requests from customers to look into making masks prompted the company to work at some prototypes. Many of the requests came from customers at nursing homes, where outbreaks of the virus can often be deadly.

The flip to making the tiny, stretchy masks that just barely cover the mouth and nose is a learning experience for a company that puts together mattresses. Much less material is used, but machines need to be retrofitted and employees retrained.

But the unprecedented need calls for unprecedented changes. Eventually, if the first batch goes well, Carlitz has plans to expand to other places that need the masks. All of the masks though, will remain free.

“I’m not trying to sell masks,” said Carlitz. “Whether it’s a dollar apiece or four dollars apiece, that’s not going to change my business. I’m going to donate the masks.”

Fanatics to make medical gear instead of baseball uniforms

Source: https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/28959410/fanatics-make-medical-gear-baseball-uniforms

Mar 26, 2020


PHILADELPHIA -- The Bryce Harper jersey that could have been worn this baseball season by the biggest Philadelphia Phillies fan is now a protective mask in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic.

Fanatics, the company that manufactures uniforms for Major League Baseball, has suspended production on jerseys and is instead using the polyester mesh fabric to make masks and gowns for hospitals in Pennsylvania and nearby states.

New York Yankees and Phillies pinstripes were still in vogue on baseball's scheduled Opening Day on Thursday -- only stitched on the protective wear made by the apparel company.

Michael Rubin, founder and executive chairman of Fanatics, was watching TV last week when he was struck by the idea to turn the 360,000-square-foot facility in Easton, Pennsylvania, into a factory for the COVID-19 virus fight.

While Rubin considered how he could make it happen, St. Luke's Hospital in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, reached out to Fanatics late last week about the possibility of the company manufacturing masks. Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf and Attorney General Josh Shapiro each contacted Rubin over the weekend and told Rubin the state was in "dire need" of more masks and gowns.

Fanatics developed a prototype that was approved by the state's emergency agency and by Tuesday the company halted production of all baseball jerseys.

Rubin, a limited ownership partner of the NBA's Philadelphia 76ers and NHL's New Jersey Devils, said he had the blessing of MLB commissioner Rob Manfred to stop producing jerseys.

"'We've got a million yards of fabric that we make these baseball uniforms from -- what would you think if we take that fabric and make masks and gowns?'" Rubin told The Associated Press what he said to Manfred. "He immediately said, 'Great. I want to do it immediately. The most important thing is we've got to help the heroes on the front line, and baseball can help play a role in it.'"

So with Manfred's support, production on the $300 jerseys for Harper, Aaron Judge, Mookie Betts and the rest of baseball's brightest stars was stopped. The company makes the uniforms for MLB and Nike.

Fanatics started fashioning masks and gowns on Tuesday, and Rubin hoped to produce nearly 15,000 masks and gowns a day. Rubin, whose Reform Alliance lobbies for changes to state probation and parole laws, said the demand was for 95% masks. The production plant had been shut down as a nonessential business, but about 100 workers have returned to work for Fanatics.

The company is making Level 1 masks, used for low-risk, nonsurgical procedures that are the accepted standard for surgical and procedural use.

Rubin said Wolf told Fanatics the state would pay for the masks and gowns. Rubin, though, said he spoke to Manfred, and Fanatics teamed with MLB to provide hospital uniforms at no cost to those in need in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York.

Rubin, who has a net worth of $2.3 billion, according for Forbes, said it would cost Fanatics about $3 million to make the masks and gowns and the company would produce at least 1 million over the course of several months.

And if you are one of the few Phillies fans left who doesn't have a Harper jersey but want one?

"I think we've got them, but I'm not 100% sure," Rubin said with a laugh. "I know we can get a mask and a jersey made from one."

There was a bit of a dust-up this week when the Devils and 76ers did an about-face on cutting salaries for employees making more than $100,000. A day after announcing the temporary 20% pay cuts because of the economics effects of the coronavirus pandemic, the teams' co-owners rescinded them.

"As an organization, I don't believe we got right up front," Rubin said. "But I believe we got it right. I think people who know me, know I'm a transparent person. I believe when you get something wrong, you just kind of fix it. Ultimately, as an organization, we fixed it. I'm proud the organization came together and did the right thing by our employees. I think we'll be rewarded by our employees who will feel we did the right thing. We got to the right place."

But when it comes to Fanatics assisting in the coronavirus fight, Rubin added, "We're less worried about manufacturing jerseys and more worried about just saving lives."

Tuesday, March 31, 2020

The Coronavirus Plague and Social Media By Michael Brendan Dougherty


Source: https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/01/coronavirus-outbreak-social-media-world-endless-unverified-information/

January 31, 2020

People wear masks in Hong Kong, China, January 31, 2020. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters)

Navigating the outbreak in a world of endless unverified information

Certain news stories drive me to an unhealthy reliance on social media. With my infant daughter sleeping in a bassinet beside me, I watched a series of individually broadcast livestreams of the mayhem developing in Paris on November 13, 2015. I suppose the first step is admitting you have a problem.

I doubt I’m the only person who seems to find every discomfiting YouTube video or Twitter thread about developments out of Wuhan, China.

Even just having your digital ear open for the chatter, you hear that Shanghai has been almost entirely “shut down,” with its residents driven to social-media boredom and rumormongering. You hear that Wuhan has been half-evacuated. I can’t even begin to comprehend what it would look like to evacuate half of a city that is larger than New York or London. Or wonder what that might mean for the rest of China, absorbing a population of that size, when the coronavirus is contagious well before it shows symptoms.

As in all tragedies, the alt-right-ish comedian Sam Hyde has been falsely and hilariously blamed for the spread of coronavirus. Earlier in the week there was a long Twitter thread by Matt Parlmer, urging people to look at the signs coming from China — the massive shutdowns and travel restrictions — that signaled a number of very likely events to anticipate, namely the disruption of global supply chains and international travel. This has now happened, and we are on the way to its being a global emergency. Firsthand accounts about how under-resourced Wuhan is for this outbreak are sprawling across YouTube. Here’s a particularly vivid one, with rumors that the virus has been known about by cab drivers in Wuhan since mid-December.

Today, a verified account on Twitter that I’ve never seen claimed that Indian scientists had discovered traces of HIV in the coronavirus. For all I know this is a totally scientifically illiterate thing to say. But there the claim is, with uncertain authority, which bolsters the conspiracy theories that the coronavirus is the product of a Chinese biological-weapons facility located near Wuhan.

Many goodhearted and decent people are on social media urging restraint. New contagious diseases are, of course, prone to induce panic. They warn us not to share any information that isn’t from a reputable public-health organization.

I wish the human mind could be reassured and calmed this way. Waiting for the official statements has actually worsened the pit in my stomach. For half the week there was speculation across unverified social media that the World Health Organization was dragging its feet because it didn’t want to embarrass China or imply that such a large and important country was responding poorly. Finally, on Thursday this week, the World Health Organization declared an international emergency. And in its statement, it cringingly praised China: “The Committee emphasized that the declaration of a PHEIC [Public Health Emergency of International Concern] should be seen in the spirit of support and appreciation for China, its people, and the actions China has taken on the frontlines of this outbreak, with transparency, and, it is to be hoped, with success.” Even the unidiomatic English grammar somehow has me imagining a Chinese official with extremely specific instructions dictating to the WHO.

The White House press briefing also contained statements emphasizing that the U.S. efforts to monitor and contain coronavirus are “complementing” China’s efforts. I’d rather have no comment appraising China’s performance in this crisis rather than ones that seem so forced and emphasized.

Maybe in the days to come, government authorities will get ahead of this public-health crisis and, like SARS, it will cause great anguish but not fundamentally disrupt the order of things. But our public officials need to think hard about how they communicate in a new world in which they are far from the only source of compelling information. Or perhaps the interruptions in the supply chain lead to major economic disruption worldwide and make everyone question the wisdom of placing so much critical industrial and commercial infrastructure in the middle of country that still contains hygiene practices known only amid extremely poverty, and a Communist government that regularly lies to the public, to itself, and to the world.

Until then, I’ll be nervously twitching through my phone and stocking up the pantry.

The Comprehensive Timeline of China’s COVID-19 Lies By Jim Geraghty

Source: https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/chinas-devastating-lies/

March 23, 2020

Paramilitary officers wearing face masks to contain the spread of COVID-19 coronavirus walk along a street in Beijing, China, March 18, 2020. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)


On today’s menu: a day-by-day, month-by-month breakdown of China’s coronavirus coverup and the irreparable damage it has caused around the globe.

The Timeline of a Viral Ticking Time Bomb

The story of the coronavirus pandemic is still being written. But at this early date, we can see all kinds of moments where different decisions could have lessened the severity of the outbreak we are currently enduring. You have probably heard variations of: “Chinese authorities denied that the virus could be transferred from human to human until it was too late.” What you have probably not heard is how emphatically, loudly, and repeatedly the Chinese government insisted human transmission was impossible, long after doctors in Wuhan had concluded human transmission was ongoing — and how the World Health Organization assented to that conclusion, despite the suspicions of other outside health experts.

Clearly, the U.S. government’s response to this threat was not nearly robust enough, and not enacted anywhere near quickly enough. Most European governments weren’t prepared either. Few governments around the world were or are prepared for the scale of the danger. We can only wonder whether accurate and timely information from China would have altered the way the U.S. government, the American people, and the world prepared for the oncoming danger of infection.

Some point in late 2019: The coronavirus jumps from some animal species to a human being. The best guess at this point is that it happened at a Chinese “wet market.”

December 6: According to a study in The Lancet, the symptom onset date of the first patient identified was “Dec 1, 2019 . . . 5 days after illness onset, his wife, a 53-year-old woman who had no known history of exposure to the market, also presented with pneumonia and was hospitalized in the isolation ward.” In other words, as early as the second week of December, Wuhan doctors were finding cases that indicated the virus was spreading from one human to another.

December 21: Wuhan doctors begin to notice a “cluster of pneumonia cases with an unknown cause.

December 25: Chinese medical staff in two hospitals in Wuhan are suspected of contracting viral pneumonia and are quarantined. This is additional strong evidence of human-to-human transmission.

Sometime in “Late December”: Wuhan hospitals notice “an exponential increase” in the number of cases that cannot be linked back to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, according to the New England Journal of Medicine.

December 30: Dr. Li Wenliang sent a message to a group of other doctors warning them about a possible outbreak of an illness that resembled severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), urging them to take protective measures against infection.

December 31: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission declares, “The investigation so far has not found any obvious human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infection.” This is the opposite of the belief of the doctors working on patients in Wuhan, and two doctors were already suspected of contracting the virus.

Three weeks after doctors first started noticing the cases, China contacts the World Health Organization.

Tao Lina, a public-health expert and former official with Shanghai’s center for disease control and prevention, tells the South China Morning Post, “I think we are [now] quite capable of killing it in the beginning phase, given China’s disease control system, emergency handling capacity and clinical medicine support.”

January 1: The Wuhan Public Security Bureau issued summons to Dr. Li Wenliang, accusing him of “spreading rumors.” Two days later, at a police station, Dr. Li signed a statement acknowledging his “misdemeanor” and promising not to commit further “unlawful acts.” Seven other people are arrested on similar charges and their fate is unknown.

Also that day, “after several batches of genome sequence results had been returned to hospitals and submitted to health authorities, an employee of one genomics company received a phone call from an official at the Hubei Provincial Health Commission, ordering the company to stop testing samples from Wuhan related to the new disease and destroy all existing samples.”

According to a New York Times study of cellphone data from China, 175,000 people leave Wuhan that day. According to global travel data research firm OAG, 21 countries have direct flights to Wuhan. In the first quarter of 2019 for comparison, 13,267 air passengers traveled from Wuhan, China, to destinations in the United States, or about 4,422 per month. The U.S. government would not bar foreign nationals who had traveled to China from entering the country for another month.

January 2: One study of patients in Wuhan can only connect 27 of 41 infected patients to exposure to the Huanan seafood market — indicating human-to-human transmission away from the market. A report written later that month concludes, “evidence so far indicates human transmission for 2019-nCoV. We are concerned that 2019-nCoV could have acquired the ability for efficient human transmission.”

Also on this day, the Wuhan Institute of Virology completed mapped the genome of the virus. The Chinese government would not announce that breakthrough for another week.

January 3: The Chinese government continued efforts to suppress all information about the virus: “China’s National Health Commission, the nation’s top health authority, ordered institutions not to publish any information related to the unknown disease, and ordered labs to transfer any samples they had to designated testing institutions, or to destroy them.”

Roughly one month after the first cases in Wuhan, the United States government is notified. Robert Redfield, the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, gets initial reports about a new coronavirus from Chinese colleagues, according to Health and Human Services secretary Alex Azar. Azar, who helped manage the response at HHS to earlier SARS and anthrax outbreaks, told his chief of staff to make sure the National Security Council was informed.

Also on this day, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission released another statement, repeating, “As of now, preliminary investigations have shown no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infections.

January 4: While Chinese authorities continued to insist that the virus could not spread from one person to another, doctors outside that country weren’t so convinced. The head of the University of Hong Kong’s Centre for Infection, Ho Pak-leung, warned that “the city should implement the strictest possible monitoring system for a mystery new viral pneumonia that has infected dozens of people on the mainland, as it is highly possible that the illness is spreading from human to human.”

January 5: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission put out a statement with updated numbers of cases but repeated, “preliminary investigations have shown no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infections.

January 6: The New York Times publishes its first report about the virus, declaring that “59 people in the central city of Wuhan have been sickened by a pneumonia-like illness.” That first report included these comments:

Wang Linfa, an expert on emerging infectious diseases at the Duke-NUS Medical School in Singapore, said he was frustrated that scientists in China were not allowed to speak to him about the outbreak. Dr. Wang said, however, that he thought the virus was likely not spreading from humans to humans because health workers had not contracted the disease. “We should not go into panic mode,” he said.

Don’t get too mad at Wang Linfa; he was making that assessment based upon the inaccurate information Chinese government was telling the world.

Also that day, the CDC “issued a level 1 travel watch — the lowest of its three levels — for China’s outbreak. It said the cause and the transmission mode aren’t yet known, and it advised travelers to Wuhan to avoid living or dead animals, animal markets, and contact with sick people.”

Also that day, the CDC offered to send a team to China to assist with the investigation. The Chinese government declined, but a WHO team that included two Americans would visit February 16.

January 8: Chinese medical authorities claim to have identified the virus. Those authorities claim and Western media continue to repeat, “there is no evidence that the new virus is readily spread by humans, which would make it particularly dangerous, and it has not been tied to any deaths.”

The official statement from the World Health Organization declares, “Preliminary identification of a novel virus in a short period of time is a notable achievement and demonstrates China’s increased capacity to manage new outbreaks . . . WHO does not recommend any specific measures for travelers. WHO advises against the application of any travel or trade restrictions on China based on the information currently available.”

January 10: After unknowingly treating a patient with the Wuhan coronavirus, Dr. Li Wenliang started coughing and developed a fever. He was hospitalized on January 12. In the following days, Li’s condition deteriorated so badly that he was admitted to the intensive care unit and given oxygen support.

The New York Times quotes the Wuhan City Health Commission’s declaration that “there is no evidence the virus can spread among humans.” Chinese doctors continued to find transmission among family members, contradicting the official statements from the city health commission.

January 11: The Wuhan City Health Commission issues an update declaring, “All 739 close contacts, including 419 medical staff, have undergone medical observation and no related cases have been found . . . No new cases have been detected since January 3, 2020. At present, no medical staff infections have been found, and no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission has been found.” They issue a Q&A sheet later that day reemphasizing that “most of the unexplained viral pneumonia cases in Wuhan this time have a history of exposure to the South China seafood market. No clear evidence of human-to-human transmission has been found.”

Also on this day, political leaders in Hubei province, which includes Wuhan, began their regional meeting. The coronavirus was not mentioned over four days of meetings.

January 13: Authorities in Thailand detected the virus in a 61-year-old Chinese woman who was visiting from Wuhan, the first case outside of China. “Thailand’s Ministry of Public Health, said the woman had not visited the Wuhan seafood market, and had come down with a fever on Jan. 5. However, the doctor said, the woman had visited a different, smaller market in Wuhan, in which live and freshly slaughtered animals were also sold.”

January 14: Wuhan city health authorities release another statement declaring, “Among the close contacts, no related cases were found.” Wuhan doctors have known this was false since early December, from the first victim and his wife, who did not visit the market.

The World Health Organization echoes China’s assessment: “Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) identified in Wuhan, China.

This is five or six weeks after the first evidence of human-to-human transmission in Wuhan.

January 15: Japan reported its first case of coronavirus. Japan’s Health Ministry said the patient had not visited any seafood markets in China, adding that “it is possible that the patient had close contact with an unknown patient with lung inflammation while in China.”

The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission begins to change its statements, now declaring, “Existing survey results show that clear human-to-human evidence has not been found, and the possibility of limited human-to-human transmission cannot be ruled out, but the risk of continued human-to-human transmission is low.” Recall Wuhan hospitals concluded human-to-human transmission was occurring three weeks earlier. A statement the next day backtracks on the possibility of human transmission, saying only, “Among the close contacts, no related cases were found.

January 17: The CDC and the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection announce that travelers from Wuhan to the United States will undergo entry screening for symptoms associated with 2019-nCoV at three U.S. airports that receive most of the travelers from Wuhan, China: San Francisco, New York (JFK), and Los Angeles airports.

The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission’s daily update declares, “A total of 763 close contacts have been tracked, 665 medical observations have been lifted, and 98 people are still receiving medical observations. Among the close contacts, no related cases were found.”

January 18: HHS Secretary Azar has his first discussion about the virus with President Trump. Unnamed “senior administration officials” told the Washington Post that “the president interjected to ask about vaping and when flavored vaping products would be back on the market.

Despite the fact that Wuhan doctors know the virus is contagious, city authorities allow 40,000 families to gather and share home-cooked food in a Lunar New Year banquet.

January 19: The Chinese National Health Commission declares the virus “still preventable and controllable.” The World Health Organization updates its statement, declaring, “Not enough is known to draw definitive conclusions about how it is transmitted, the clinical features of the disease, the extent to which it has spread, or its source, which remains unknown.”

January 20: The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission declares for the last time in its daily bulletin, “no related cases were found among the close contacts.

That day, the head of China’s national health commission team investigating the outbreak, confirmed that two cases of infection in China’s Guangdong province had been caused by human-to-human transmission and medical staff had been infected.

Also on this date, the Wuhan Evening News newspaper, the largest newspaper in the city, mentions the virus on the front page for the first time since January 5.

January 21: The CDC announced the first U.S. case of a the coronavirus in a Snohomish County, Wash., resident who returning from China six days earlier.

By this point, millions of people have left Wuhan, carrying the virus all around China and into other countries.

January 22: WHO director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus continued to praise China’s handling of the outbreak. “I was very impressed by the detail and depth of China’s presentation. I also appreciate the cooperation of China’s Minister of Health, who I have spoken with directly during the last few days and weeks. His leadership and the intervention of President Xi and Premier Li have been invaluable, and all the measures they have taken to respond to the outbreak.”

In the preceding days, a WHO delegation conducted a field visit to Wuhan. They concluded, “deployment of the new test kit nationally suggests that human-to-human transmission is taking place in Wuhan.” The delegation reports, “their counterparts agreed close attention should be paid to hand and respiratory hygiene, food safety and avoiding mass gatherings where possible.”

At a meeting of the WHO Emergency Committee, panel members express “divergent views on whether this event constitutes a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern’ or not. At that time, the advice was that the event did not constitute a PHEIC.”

President Trump, in an interview with CNBC at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, declared, “We have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China. We have it under control. It’s going to be just fine.

January 23: Chinese authorities announce their first steps for a quarantine of Wuhan. By this point, millions have already visited the city and left it during the Lunar New Year celebrations. Singapore and Vietnam report their first cases, and by now an unknown but significant number of Chinese citizens have traveled abroad as asymptomatic, oblivious carriers.

January 24: Vietnam reports person-to-person transmission, and Japan, South Korea, and the U.S report their second cases. The second case is in Chicago. Within two days, new cases are reported in Los Angeles, Orange County, and Arizona. The virus is in now in several locations in the United States, and the odds of preventing an outbreak are dwindling to zero.

On February 1, Dr. Li Wenliang tested positive for coronavirus. He died from it six days later.

One final note: On February 4, Mayor of Florence Dario Nardella urged residents to hug Chinese people to encourage them in the fight against the novel coronavirus. Meanwhile, a member of Associazione Unione Giovani Italo Cinesi, a Chinese society in Italy aimed at promoting friendship between people in the two countries, called for respect for novel coronavirus patients during a street demonstration. “I’m not a virus. I’m a human. Eradicate the prejudice.”

ADDENDUM: We’ll get back to regular politics soon enough. In the meantime, note that Bernie Sanders held a virtual campaign event Sunday night “from Vermont, railing against the ongoing Senate coronavirus rescue bill. He skipped a key procedural vote on that bill.”


China Is Pushing a ‘Zero’ Myth on COVID-19 By Jianli Yang & Aaron Rhodes

Source: https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/03/china-is-pushing-a-zero-myth-on-covid-19-and-attacking-press-freedom/

March 27, 2020

A woman wearing a protective mask walks past a portrait of Chinese President Xi Jinping on a street as the country is hit by an outbreak of the coronavirus in Shanghai, China, March 12, 2020. (Aly Song/Reuters)

The regime’s censorship and distortions are a threat to global public health as well as a violation of human rights.

Chinese president Xi Jinping has a new slogan: “Zero” — the goal of reducing to zero the number of cases of the Wuhan coronavirus, aka COVID-19. Reaching zero is crucial to achieving his broader goal of global leadership and domination. Xi must show the world that the totalitarian Chinese political system is vindicated by the defeat of the virus. The truth about COVID-19 inside China is the greatest obstacle to his ambition.

For years now, Beijing has tried to position China under the Communist Party as the champion and leader of a new, emerging, post-American global order. At the Davos conclave in 2017, Xi spoke of his government’s determination to play a responsible role in defending and contributing to multilateral efforts to “secure peace and reduce poverty.” He was applauded for opposing protectionism. All states, he intoned, should “view their own interests in a broader context” and “refrain from pursuing their own interests at the expense of others.” China has assiduously asserted influence in global institutions, especially United Nations bodies, where Chinese nationals lead four of 15 specialized agencies. In his speech at the special summit of G20 leaders on March 26, Xi showed his determination to build his own image as a world leader.

For him to succeed in his long march through the international community, he needs to have a reputation for success at addressing challenges such as COVID-19. As two veteran China watchers, Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, pointed out in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, one’s legitimacy as a global leader depends on domestic governance, the provision of global public goods, and the ability and willingness to muster and coordinate a global response to crises. To lead the world response to the pandemic, China must set an example for the rest of the world to follow.

The long-term plan hit a large speed bump with revelations about the regime’s malfeasance in covering up COVID-19, and the Communist Party’s efforts to turn the story around, making itself heroic, are well documented. But the plan could run aground if a second outbreak, which some experts warn is inevitable, occurs in China. In this situation, the regime is turning reflexively to traditional Communist tactics: propaganda and the control of information.

Neutralizing Independent Media
China has expelled reporters for the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal, sources it cannot control. The regime has clamped down increasingly on independent journalists as its domestic practices have become increasingly inhumane, especially with respect to its repression of religious minorities, including Uighur Muslims, who have been subjected to mass internment.

China ranks low in international measures of press freedom. Last year, in a survey of 180 countries with respect to media independence, media pluralism, and respect for the safety and freedom of journalists, Reporters Without Borders ranked China 177th. In “Control, Halt, Delete: Reporting in China Under Threat of Expulsion,” a new report from the Beijing-based Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC), foreign journalists document practices that Chinese authorities have employed that have severely affected their reporting.

Beijing has delayed and placed restrictions on visas for foreign journalists. While the standard length of a long-term journalist visa, J-1, is one year, many foreign correspondents who have reported critically about the Chinese regime have received curtailed visas. In 2018, five correspondents received curtailed visas. In 2019, at least a dozen received visas for six months or less. Truncated visas require frequent renewal, and Beijing has made that process more arduous not just for the journalists but for their families as well. This practice is called out in the FCCC report.

Three correspondents from Wall Street Journal were expelled on February 19 over an opinion piece critical of Beijing’s handling of the COVID-19 outbreak. “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia,” the headline read. In announcing the expulsions, a foreign-ministry spokesman called the article “racist.” It was the first time in more than two decades that journalists holding valid credentials had been ordered to leave China, although since 2013 others have been expelled in effect, through non-renewal of their visas.

Beijing has also established red lines for foreign correspondents. In particular, anything critical of Xi Jinping and his family is forbidden. Last year, Beijing declined to renew the credentials of another Wall Street Journal reporter, who had reported about investigations, in Australia, into the activities of one of Xi’s cousins, who was suspected of involvement in organized crime and money laundering. In the FCCC report, the bureau chief of an English-language news organization is quoted as saying that the Chinese foreign ministry had explicitly told them that they would face the “anger of other arms of the government,” and not just the foreign ministry, if they wrote the “wrong pieces about Xi.”

Criticism of the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang has also drawn the ire of the authorities. In 2018, Megha Rajagopalan, the Beijing bureau chief for BuzzFeed News, was unable to renew her visa. During her six years in China, Rajagopalan had reported extensively on human-rights abuses, including the detention of Uighurs and others in Xinjiang province. The Committee to Protect Journalists considers the government’s refusal to renew visas in such cases to be “acts of retribution.”

Last year, CNN’s Beijing correspondent Matt Rivers reported extensively on how, during his trip to Xinjiang province, he had been subjected to repeated visa checks, harassment by local officials, attempts by the authorities to block his reporting, and physical trailing. The FCCC report adds that Chinese authorities, through intimidation and explicit warnings, regularly pressure people to avoid speaking to foreign media representatives. Journalists and their sources are monitored by facial recognition and other surveillance techniques.

Of course, China also extensively censors new media. A Harvard University study found that Chinese authorities block as many as 18,000 websites, including many standard, independent sources of international news. Among the terms censored on the Internet are “human rights,” “oppression,” and references to Tiananmen Square and the dissident and Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo. The BBC, which had often reported critically on the Chinese government, is blocked in China. All books published in China are censored. The extent of censorship and control over the media by the CCP cannot be better described than by Xi Jinping himself, who in 2016 said, “All the media must bear the Party’s surname.”

Breaking the Media Blockage
The Zero campaign depends on censorship and makes it a universal political obligation for Chinese citizens to collectively deny their own public-health crisis. That China’s health statistics are manipulated for the Communist Party’s political benefit is not news. Local officials, medical personnel, and, indeed, the entire society need to participate in the deception. It is the newest of a string of impossible tasks that the Communist Party has demanded of the Chinese people, reminiscent of Mao’s absurd productivity quotas, and of his often-lethal punishments for failure. As Roger Scruton observed, “it takes infinite force to make people to do what is impossible.”

The government, which claims that virtually no new COVID-19 cases have appeared recently in Wuhan, has begun to relax the lockdown in Hubei Province. But while the Chinese regime tries to control perceptions of events inside the country, widespread anger and intensified distrust at the government’s moral and administrative failures is giving rise to a groundswell of citizen journalists attempting to break through the official propaganda machinery of CCTV, CGTN, People’s Daily, and Global Times and to expose what is happening.

The evidence they present about COVID-19 contradicts official narratives. Stories on Chinese social media, censored or removed almost as soon as they appear, reveal how local governments cover up new cases and how hospitals are ordered to report new cases as normal flu or pneumonia.

The stories indicate that Hubei Province, far from moving toward normality, is being locked down again by people and police in the surrounding provinces who know the real situation in Hubei. One video showed a riot that occurred when Hubei police tried to open the border with Jiangxi — people and police in Jiangxi revolted because they would be exposed to Hubei. The government brags about mass recoveries from the virus, but independent media have reported that up to 14 percent of those have tested positive again. The regime appears to be cooking the books on epidemiological statistics, to be not counting cases in which tests indicate infection but people are asymptomatic. Censors almost immediately removed a photo from the Caixin website showing a truck delivering 2,500 urns filled with the ashes of cremated people. Censors removed as well as an accompanying report that a truck had made another such delivery the same day.

In the past, the Chinese Communist Party’s restrictions on the free flow of information seemed to Americans and others in democratic countries to be a matter mainly concerning the freedom of the Chinese people, important as a matter of upholding the universal right to freedom of expression. But the regime’s distortions of the truth are now more than abstract problems for the international community. They are threats to global public health — indeed, matters of life and death.

Jianli Yang is the founder and president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China. Aaron Rhodes is the human-rights editor of Dissident magazine and the president of the Forum for Religious Freedom Europe.

Thursday, March 26, 2020

Coronavirus lockdown — Ex-Green Beret's advice for dealing with the unknown By Chad Storlie

When I was a Special Forces soldier in training, my team and I developed a way to break stress into 5-minute blocks


Source: https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/coronavirus-lockdown-ex-green-beret-advice-dealing

March 25, 2020

The struggle I faced as the COVID-19 recommendations became school closings, "stay-at-home" orders, store closings, and zero social interactions was: how will I make it through the day?

I have critical work responsibilities, a large team of now remote workers to lead, my wife is working from home, we need to home school three boys, get to the grocery store, and more as my mind quickly spun across the entire list of changes.

When I was a Special Forces soldier in training, my team and I developed a way to break stress into 5-minute blocks and then just do the best we could in the next five minutes to defeat stress five minutes at a time.

It was pouring rain at Camp MacKall, North Carolina and the 3rd team member had just quit. I was the student leader of a 14 person, now 11, team of Special Forces candidates attending the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course.

SFAS is the three-week "testing" phase where students are given little information, there are no published standards of success, and instructors only tell candidates to "do the best you can."

The secret in difficult and trying times is to focus solely on doing well over the next 5 minutes and only focus on those next 5 minutes no matter what.

The tasks the prior day ranged from writing a 1,500-word essay on the U.S. Constitution after completing a 14-mile road march with 60 lbs. of gear with a late morning 4-hour cross country land navigation exercise with the same 60 lbs., and an official U.S. Army Physical Fitness test.

A central part of SFAS is dealing with the unknown. At SFAS, candidates hold no rank, have no names on their uniforms, and are only told what to bring to an event.

Candidates are instructed at the last moment what task they will perform and never told how long, how fast, or how far they will have to do a training event.

Will I run 3 miles or 9? Will I road march 6 miles or 14?

At SFAS, dealing with the unknown is one of the hardest challenges.

Back in the pouring rain, my team and I were completing an event called "Sand Babies" where the team task was designed by psychologists and likely sadomasochists.

It starts with a 5-foot pile of sand, the team then fills 20-30 sandbags, carries the sandbags as a group 300-400 yards over slippery hills, all sandbags are inspected for a minimum weight, the sandbags are emptied into a new pile, and the team walks back to the original sand pile to start again.

As my team of 11 started out again, another person quit and we were down to 10 people, 25 soaking wet sandbags and an overwhelming feeling of despair.

Focus on the Next 5 Minutes. The solution, we found, was to focus on the next 5 minutes and no longer.

In the unknown and difficult, your biggest enemy is your mind that wants to plan and to anticipate just how bad things may become.

The secret in difficult and trying times is to focus solely on doing well over the next 5 minutes and only focus on those next 5 minutes no matter what.

Do Your Best at Every Task – No Matter How Small. In those 5 minutes, we performed every task, no matter how small to the highest level of quality.

We moved as a team, tied the sandbags tight, filled the sandbags to the top, and carried our weapons at the ready, just as we would in combat.

We learned that by controlling the immediate tasks around us and doing the tasks well, we controlled and reduced our stress levels.

We cannot control the world, but we can choose to do the tasks in our immediate proximity well.

Know Your Purpose. Our new purpose was to complete the "Sand Babies" mission successfully and have no one else quit.

Now we had a dual purpose to complete our mission and ensure that everyone was there at the end.

A strong sense of purpose is the lifeblood during periods of suffering and unknown. A strong sense of purpose is an immeasurable aid.

Be Prepared to Improvise. As we walked, one person's rucksack began to rip under the weight of 120 lbs. of wet sand and the normal 60 lbs. of gear.

Another team member stepped up without even talking, grabbed a sandbag in their arms and kept on walking.

Another person behind him did the same. And they both did it without even speaking.

In life, in the rain, going to the store, and in military operations, all plans at some point go to hell.

Improvisation is expected and it will be needed. Always expect to react to the unexpected.

Everyone is a Leader. In the instance when someone’s rucksack began to tear, someone stepped up to help, and another person followed.

Bad times call for everyone to lead and to lead even in small things.

When a leader leads in small things, others follow the example.

If you are waiting for a "Patton" like monumental instance to lead, you are not going to get it. Instead, be like Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. during the first waves landing on Omaha Beach when the D-Day landings looked like a disaster.

Under intense Nazi German fire and scared troops desperate for leadership, Roosevelt calmly walked the line, inspired, promoted enthusiasm, and lead the attack forward off the beaches.

When Those 5 Minutes Are Done – Do It Again. The hardest part of focusing on 5 minutes is doing it again, and again, and again. But when you do 5 minutes well, 30 minutes pass, then an hour, and a day. The way to win the day is to win 5 minutes, 288 times in a row.

When I was an Iraq, I was leading a Special Operations planning team and we were under intense pressure following a devastating truck bomb at the United Nations temporary headquarters and a series of violent, coordinated attacks around Baghdad.

Another Special Forces officer and a friend of mine saw my stress, held up his hand signifying the number "five" and silently spoke "five minutes" while our commander gave us guidance.

It helped as I switched into "five-minute" mode for the next several days.

COVID-19 will pass and will become an event in our history.

We need to think as a country, as families, as organizations, and as individuals how to do the best we can for the next five minutes.

Doing a part as best we can in 5-minute segments will see us through this and future challenges.


Chad Storlie is a retired US Army Special Forces officer, an Iraq combat veteran, and has 15 years of university teaching experience as an adjunct Professor of Marketing. He is a mid-level B2B marketing executive and a widely published author on leadership, business, data, military and technology topics.